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convergence of an important new 
development: the announcement that 
MERCOSUR and the European Union 
(EU) have struck a political agreement 
aimed at concluding the negotiations and 
implementing a preferential bi-regional 
agreement. 
It will be vital to monitor the progress of 
the activities aimed at completing the 
approval and effective implementation of 
that agreement, with a view to identifying 
concrete actions related to trade in 
agricultural and agribusiness goods and 
services that could be promoted with IICA 
technical cooperation, in particular for the 
development of the convergence of the 
In response to the convergence between 
the countries of the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) and those of 
the Pacific Alliance, and its effects 
on agricultural trade, this technical 
note, addressed to the ministers of 
agriculture of the Americas, considers 
the contribution that the Inter-American 
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture 
(IICA) could make through the technical 
cooperation it provides to the countries of 
the region under its Hemispheric Program 
on International Trade and Regional 
Integration. 
Specifically, this paper focuses on the 
potential impact on the aforementioned 
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Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR within 
the network of bi-regional agreements with 
the European Union.
The convergence 
between the Pacific 
Alliance and 
MERCOSUR 
Close links between MERCOSUR and 
the Pacific Alliance are recognized 
as being one of the priorities of both 
regional integration groups. This does 
not necessarily mean the fusion of two 
integration processes undertaken in 
response to different situations which, at 
present, use dissimilar methodologies. 
But it does mean making progress with 
the many steps that have already been 
agreed to increase the connectivity 
and convergence of the economic and 
production systems of the member 
countries, with the consequent positive 
impact on regional governance. Steps in 
that direction were included in the “joint 
action plan” approved at the Thirteenth 
Presidential Summit of the Pacific 
Alliance, held in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, 
on 24 July 2018. 
The countries currently involved in 
the two integration efforts have a long 
history of working together. It should be 
remembered that they were, together with 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the same 
countries that in 1960 promoted the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (ALALC) 
and then the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI).
They are also bound to be at the heart 
of any initiative for joint action aimed at 
addressing the situation in Latin America, 
especially in view of their importance to 
the region as a whole, accounting as they 
do for 81% of the population, 86% of gross 
product, 89% of foreign trade, and 81% of 
investment flows from overseas. Without 
these countries, it is hard to imagine 
any initiative for economic integration in 
Latin America, a region characterized by 
fragmentation, having an effective impact 
at the regional level and, therefore, a 
reasonable global projection. 
Hence the interest, within and beyond 
the region, in the actions aimed at 
intensifying the links between the set of 
countries that make up the Pacific Alliance 
and MERCOSUR (Grupo MAP). As in 
the case of other groups of countries 
that are important for understanding 
contemporary international relations (for 
example, the Group of 7 and the Group 
of 20), they are recognized for their 
ability to take the initiative on issues that 
facilitate international, global and regional 
governance and can have an effective 
impact on current conditions. In acting 
as a group, they are perceived, in their 
respective spheres of action, as important 
stakeholders that must be taken into 
account.
Going forward, two areas of joint action 
can be foreseen for the Grupo MAP. The 
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first concerns the issues incorporated 
into the aforementioned joint action plan 
approved at the Puerto Vallarta Summit, 
which calls for the implementation of 
various institutional and regulatory actions. 
The second refers to joint initiatives that 
this group of countries could promote in 
order to impact issues that are important 
for their respective interests, be they 
global or regional in scope. They may 
come to think it desirable to undertake 
joint initiatives on three issues that are 
especially important for their respective 
international trade relation agendas.
The first important issue for joint action 
by this group of countries is the question 
of the reforms needed at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). What are the reforms 
of the WTO that could, or should, be of 
greatest interest to the MERCOSUR and 
Pacific Alliance countries? What concrete 
proposals could this group of countries 
present? What position might the Grupo 
MAP countries take in response to the 
proposals that other countries or groups of 
countries, such as the United States, the 
EU, China, the Group of 7, etc., may be 
interested in introducing? One issue that 
would warrant special attention are the 
standards that affect the harmonization 
of the preferential agreements that 
developing countries negotiate with the 
commitments assumed in the multilateral 
trading system. In fact, the predominant 
interpretations that have predominated 
with regard to Article XXIX of the 1994 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) have generated restrictions that 
are not necessarily based on what is 
established explicitly in the text. 
A second important issue is the need 
to strengthen and make full use of the 
opportunities provided by ALADI, especially 
through the mechanism of partial scope 
agreements envisaged in the 1980 Treaty 
of Montevideo and Resolution No. 2 of the 
Council of Ministers. This is a very practical 
and functional instrument that allows two 
or more member countries to develop 
strategies aimed at promoting many 
different kinds of transnational productive 
linkages, intended to be regional in scope 
and have a global projection.
A third issue is the development of bi-
regional preferential trade agreements 
involving Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR 
countries. Some examples are the bi-
regional agreements with the EU, the 
United States and China, although others 
are perfectly possible. 
The conclusion of the negotiations of 
the bi-regional agreement between 
MERCOSUR and the EU will open the way 
to the connection with the agreements that 
the EU has signed with the Pacific Alliance 
countries, as proposed previously by 
Ricardo Lagos and Osvaldo Rosales. This 
could lead to a very functional network of 
bi-regional agreements for the promotion 
of joint investments involving businesses 
from both regions. The same thing could 
result from a network of bi-regional 
agreements between the Grupo MAP and 
other countries. 
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The bi-regional 
negotiations between 
the EU and MERCOSUR
The negotiations between MERCOSUR 
and the EU have taken 20 years to 
complete, while it is 28 years since the 
political decision was taken to embark 
on a journey that was never expected 
to take such a long time. The 28 June 
announcement of the signing of the bi-
regional political agreement marked the 
start of a new phase which, if successful, 
will result in the full entry into force of the 
agreement and, even more importantly, 
produce the desired effects in terms of 
trade and productive investment. 
Throughout the years of negotiations with 
the EU, the idea was endorsed by the 
various governments of the MERCOSUR 
countries. Now they have embarked on 
the final phase, which could take another 
two to three years. Then the agreement 
will be totally concluded, and its effects felt 
in both regions. 
This bi-regional agreement will create 
opportunities and pose challenges. If the 
opportunities are tapped correctly, they 
will translate into investments, trade flows 
and the creation of jobs. They will also 
enhance the image, and ultimately the 
prestige, of both regions, benefitting their 
policies aimed at further integration into 
international trade. The challenges will be 
related to the capacity of governments, 
business and society as a whole to 
overcome the practical difficulties that 
could arise in the future and affect the 
necessary balances of the agreement. 
Talent, political will and organizational 
technology will be required to address 
those challenges.
What are some of the steps that each 
MERCOSUR country will have to take for 
the bi-regional agreement to be concluded 
and enter in force? Some steps have to 
be taken simultaneously. Based on what 
has been observed in other specific cases 
of agreements of this kind with the EU, 
four main steps will be required, plus other 
possible complementary ones. 
The first step will be to disseminate details 
of the “small print” of the agreement. To be 
in a position to talk about what exactly has 
been agreed, it will be necessary to read 
all the texts carefully from the perspective 
of the different sectors involved, both 
at the national level and in the different 
regions of each country, and in terms 
of the dynamics of trade and future 
investments. Attention will have to be paid 
to mechanisms that, explicitly or implicitly, 
would make it possible to activate different 
types of “escape valves” and others 
designed to enable SMEs to make an 
“assisted transition” and modernize their 
operations for the new expanded market. 
The EU employed mechanisms of this kind 
to facilitate the incorporation of Eastern 
European countries. 
A second step will be for the countries to 
begin to reach the domestic consensus 
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5required for their legislatures to approve 
the agreement. This means explaining its 
contents in terms of the possible effects 
on each sector and region of each country 
and, especially, making it clear what the 
effects would be if a given MERCOSUR 
member country were to be unable to 
secure parliamentary approval.
A third step will be for each country to 
make the preparations necessary to take 
advantage of the agreement effectively. 
Businesses and institutions will have to 
get ready to compete effectively in the 
European market, especially in niches of 
goods and services in which, for various 
reasons, they may have significant 
advantages. The internationalization of 
niches of competitiveness will, therefore, 
be one of the main advantages to be 
exploited in relation to the growing 
demand from the emerging middle classes 
in numerous developing countries. It will 
also call for the training of good specialists 
to help stakeholders better understand 
how to operate successfully in the 
European market, tapping the advantages 
offered by the bi-regional agreement. This 
will also be a priority sphere of action for 
academic institutions, which would benefit 
from becoming involved in networks for 
training specialists within the bi-regional 
framework. 
The fourth step will be to promote 
concerted action by the MERCOSUR and 
Pacific Alliance countries to achieve the 
effective coordination of joint projects, 
related to both the production of goods 
and the delivery of services, to benefit 
from the network of agreements with the 
EU, taking into account those already 
agreed upon with the Pacific Alliance 
countries. 
The bi-regional 
negotiations with the 
European Union
The following are some of the main 
questions that need to be considered with 
respect to the bi-regional negotiations and 
their potential impact on the convergence 
of the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR: 
 How could the agreement that 
MERCOSUR and the EU may sign be 
integrated into the network of different 
kinds of preferential agreements that 
the EU has already concluded with the 
Pacific Alliance countries, or with the 
countries engaged in the process of 
modernization?
 What will be the effects of the 
negotiation and, in particular, the 
effective implementation of the bi-
regional agreement of MERCOSUR 
with the EU on future interaction 
in the field of foreign trade in both 
agricultural goods and services, 
in the Alliance and MERCOSUR 
countries? And, especially, what 
prospects are opening up for future 
collaboration between the countries of 
the two subregions, and with the other 
countries of the region, bearing in 
mind the preferential agreements that 
already exist with the EU?
 What effects would the network 
expanded by the MERCOSUR-EU 
agreement have on cooperation 
between businesses in the 
MERCOSUR and Pacific Alliance 
countries ―with the possible 
participation of European businesses― 
and on their joint investments in third 
countries, including those of the EU? 
And, if that were the case, what would 
be some of the priority spheres of action 
for facilitating such cooperation? In 
other words, with regard to competitive 
intelligence; types of joint action 
between companies; options in the 
areas of financing for trade, technical 
assistance, technological cooperation, 
and productive investments; 
and analysis of specific cases of 
cooperation between companies, both 
in the region itself and in Europe and 
other developing countries, especially in 
Asia and Africa? 
 How useful could ALADI’s institutional 
framework be for the development 
of the actions to be implemented? 
In that regard, what role could be 
played by partial scope agreements 
in the different modalities envisaged 
in the 1980 Treaty of Asunción and in 
Resolution 2 of the 1980 Council of 
Ministers? Those rules were some of 
the main innovations introduced with 
respect to the institutional framework 
carried over from ALALC. They even 
open up the possibility of sectoral 
and multisectoral approaches for the 
gradual construction of opportunities 
for integration among countries in the 
region, compatible with the rules of 
the multilateral trading system applied 
following approval of the Enabling 
Clause during the Tokyo Round. 
 What impact could successful joint 
action initiatives involving Alliance and 
MERCOSUR countries and the EU at 
the bi-regional level have on future bi-
regional agreements —for example, 
with the United States and China? 
 What role could be played by 
international financial institutions such 
as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), the Development Bank of 
Latin America (CAF) and, ultimately, 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
to facilitate technical assistance and 
financing for joint projects involving 
MERCOSUR and Pacific Alliance 
companies? 
With regard to each of these questions, it 
is feasible to reach agreement on activities 
for implementation under different types of 
technical cooperation promoted by IICA, 
with the participation of interested countries 
and other international cooperation 
agencies, including the EU itself. 
Finally, through the Hemispheric Program 
on International Trade and Regional 
Integration, IICA could contribute to 
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analyzing the characteristics of the 
interregional agricultural and intraregional 
trade of the Pacific Alliance member 
countries, and offer technical assistance 
to help the countries understand and 
interpret the fine print of the text of the 
agreement and identify possible trade 
opportunities that would allow the private 
sector to tap and make good use of the 
trade agreements signed.
For further information, please contact 
Adriana Campos Azofeifa, Manager 
of IICA’s Hemispheric Program on 
International Trade and Regional 
Integration, by email (adriana.campos@
iica.int) or phone (506) 2216-0170.
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